Stationed in a country where cultural heritage is guarded with nationaUstic fervor and latent anti-Americanism can be ignited at any time, tbe American School of Classical Studies at Athens (ASCSA) has neither celebrated nor condemned the service of some of its most prominent members during the Second World War in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the first American inteUigence agency.^ The School has strategicaUy engaged ASCSA archivist, for inviting me to contribute to this volume and for faciUtating my research at the Archives of the School. I am also thankñU for their insightful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the three in "boundary work,"^ emphasizing its scientific mission and nonpoUtical disposition. "Scientificity" and appeals to poUtical independence are invaluable tools in the efforts of institutions such as the ASCSA to maintain their professional autonomy, and, as Gieryn suggests, to seal themselves off from outside powers and from any blame for undesirable consequences of nonscientists' consumption of scientific knowledge.^ Yet again, the rhetoric of scientific purism prevents us from understanding the social and historical complexities of scientific and cultural practices. A microsociological approach, a biographical lens that wiU focus riot on "scientists qua scientists" but on their relations with other social groups and fianctions and on their commitments to multiple identities and roles, can offer us a more nuanced, r icher perspective on the place of archaeologists within the social, poUtical, and cultural milieu in which they operate. A discussion of American archaeologists' activities during the war may touch upon at least two sensitive areas. First, it may be seen as a chaUenge to the basic premises on which the relationships of foreign archaeological institutions with their host country, Greece in this case, are based-namely, those of pure scientific interest and independent scholarly preoccupation. Second, it may appear to contest the presumed divide between American archaeology in Greece and politics. In many circles, definitely in academic ones, the relationship between archaeology and espionage is weU known.'' Studies of the relationship between archaeology and state projects such as nation building, colonialism, and imperialism also abound, with the lion's share undoubtedly focusing on the Middle East, since it occupies a central place in world politics today^ More and more, the field of Greek archaeology is also being opened up to discussions about nation building, national identity, and representation politics,' while the role of classicism and HeUenism as a western European project is treated in an ever-growing Uterature.' The often contentious Greek-American post-World War II relationship, however, has put a cap on exploring and arguing about the social, poUtical, economic, and broader cultural role of American institutions such as the ASCSA in the recent history of Greece. I argue, therefore, for an open, historically grounded discussion.
A study of American archaeologists'work in espionage and inteUigence can be framed within the postwar American agenda to broaden its sphere anonymous Hesperia reviewers, as weU as Volker R. Berghahn, Thomas Gallant, Evanthis HatzivassiUou, Kostis KarpozUos, Nikolas Kosmatopoulos, and KaUiopi Minioudaki, for carefiiUy reading the initial manuscript and contributing their advice and assistance. Early versions of this paper were presented at the ASCSA PhilheUenism workshop in Athens (May 18, 2010) and the Center for the United States and the Cold War, the Tamiment Library 6c Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York University (April 5,2012) . I am very gratefiU to my audiences in Athens and in New York for their discussion. Thomas F Gieryn (1983) to describe discursive practices in which scientists engage to estabUsh their epistemic authority and to separate their work from the nonscientific world and from rival epistemic authorities. The ASCSA was estabUshed in 1881 by a consortium of nine American universities in coUaboration with leading businessmen as a privately fiinded, nonprofit educational institution with the expUcit goal to promote the study of Classics in the United States. For the history of the School, see Lord 1947 and Meritt 1984. of political and economic infiuence and to impose its system of values and ideas. Such an instrumental approach, however, despite its merits, would discount the diversity of actions and opinions within the circles of individuals studied, as weU as the various nuances that can be distinguished in the complex relationship between inteUectual and poUtical practices. As in the case of the Frankfurt School inteUectuals,^ it maybe argued that the archaeologists ofthe ASCSA had a Umited influence on the prosecution ofthe war and the government poUcies that foUowed. I suggest, however, that this episode in the history ofthe School showcases the porous boundaries between scholarly and poUtical practices, chaUenging the proclaimed social, poUtical, and cultural marginaUty ofthe archaeologists, speaking to their national as weU as their scholarly identity and fiarther affirming what Pierre Bourdieu has suggested: "capital breeds capital."'The OSS programmaticaUy drew from and capitaUzed on the inteUectual resources of the United States, and for the first time on such a large scale brought together the decision-making and the scholarly elites, often creating incongruous aUiances.
The term was coined by
The inteUectual and cultural authority that archaeologists such as Carl W. Biegen, Rodney S. Young, M. Alison Frantz, John L. Caskey, Dorothy H. Cox, and others were caUed upon to give to the war effort hardly steered the course ofthe war. It did, however, provide the inteUectual grounding that aU pubUc policy needs, and contributed to the formulation of a narrative that first explained the need for greater American involve-• ment in the region, then outlined the poUtical, economic, and ideological future of postwar Greece. While aware of the moral compromises they were often caUed upon to make as they navigated the treacherous and violent poUtical waters of Greece, the archaeologists under discussion and the institution they represented emerged invigorated from the war, and again found themselves in a position of authority as cultural interpreters and mediators between the two countries. In 1942 In -1943 The war declared by the ItaUans on October 28,1940, did not take the School by surprise. As early as 1939, it had authorized Lincoln MacVeagh, the American ambassador in Greece, to have the legation take over the property of the School in case of emergency. In coUaboration with the Greek archaeological authorities, measures were taken for the protection of monuments, and records and finds were packed away in bombproof shelters; on the initiative of some of the younger and most adventurous members ofthe School, an ambulance was donated to the Greek Red Cross and driven to the Albanian front." The driver, Rodney Stuart Young, who had joined the staff of the Agora excavations in 1933 before receiving his doctorate in classical archaeology from Princeton in 1940, would risk his Ufe twice during the war. In the spring of 1941, he was carried to a hospital with perforated intestines after trying to drive the ambulance from the front back to a Red Cross station." In 1945, during a mission by the United Nations ReUef and RehabiUtation Administration (UNRRA) to the Aegean islands, his boat capsized with great loss of life and Young was saved only after enduring five hours in the water. ^* Young's contribution to the war effort in Greece, and that of other members ofthe School, however, extended far beyond the reUef and rehabiUtation work; such efforts occupied him and many ofthe others even after their return to the United States. Some of these men were also involved in the gradual articulation of postwar American poUcy in the region and its disentanglement from the poUcies of its wartime aUies, primarily those ofthe British-"the cousins," as they were often identified in code. A year before taking up his assignment as SI officer and head ofthe Greek Desk in Cairo in May 1943, Young had worked with the directing officers ofthe Secret IntelUgence Services (SIS) to design and promote what was entitled the Comprehensive Greek Project. While aUuding to the potential role of the U.S. in the postwar world, this report at the same time identified a role for individuals such as Young in the endeavor: "Questions of High Policy do not come near the scope of an S.I. Officer, but the number of Americans who are intimately identified with and who know Greece by instinct rather than by inteUect are so few that when such an officer chances to have a 12. Stimson and Bundy 1948, p. 188. 13. Hymoff 1972; Smith [1972 Smith [ ] 2005 Smith 1983; Winks 1996; O'DonneU 2004. 14. Meritt 1984, pp. 6-7. 15 (ASCSA member 1931 (ASCSA member -1936 (ASCSA member ,1959 (ASCSA member -1960 was a professor of arcbaeology at Harvard University, speciaUzing in Greek inscriptions and classical civiUzation. His obituary in the New York Times (Januar;, ' 14, 1995, p. 30 ) remembered him as the person who "discovered a kleroterion, a mechanical device that the Athenians had used to aUot offices by random cboice rather than through election. It helped to explain the nature of Athenian democracy." coUaborated in the early 1930s in excavations at Troy, along with Marion Rawson and Dorothy Cox, aU under the supervision of Biegen.
ARCHAEOLOGISTS AT WAR AND THE PROSPECT OF A NEW WORLD ORDER
The partnership ofthe OSS with the American archaeological community in Greece ran deeper stiU. It was first estabUshed in Washington, D.C, and in Princeton at the Institute for Advanced Study, where the ASCSA had its pubUcations office. Biegen, an eminent archaeologist known worldwide for his excavations at Troy and Pylos, who had been affiliated with the ASCSA since 1910,^^ was recruited to head the Greek section ofthe Foreign NationaUties Branch (FNB) in Washington, D.C, with Mary AUson Frantz as his assistant. Biegen and Frantz, whose careers are inextricably intertwined with the history of the ASCSA, caUed upon their coUeagues at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton early in 1942 to assist in the composition of a monograph titled "The Kingdom of Greece," which outUned the modern history of Greece and its current state of affairs. It was also at the Institute that the OSS would seek ad-vice regarding personnel. Frantz, for example, was introduced to the service by Benjamin D. Meritt, professor of epigraphy there and longtime member ofthe ASCSA.^-' Like many of their coUeagues, Biegen and Frantz were intimately famiUar with modern Greece and its turbulent poUtical history; on occasion, they would also step away from their professional Uves to serve in other capacities. In 1918, Biegen served for a year on the American Red Cross Commission, investigating eastern Macedonia and assisting with the repatriation and rehabiUtation of thousands of refugees who had been held as prisoners in Bulgaria during the war.^'' For the most part, the FNB studied European and Mediterranean ethnic groups living in the United States and gathered, by tape recorder, their knowledge of political trends and conditions affecting their native lands. Frantz described her work as Junior Social Science Analyst as foUows:
The branch that I was concerned with was working on poUtical movements of exiles in the United States. So many ofthe occupied countries had their statesmen, politicians, or interested persons taking refiage in aU kinds of places, and a great many of them, of course, ended up in the United States. And we were foUowing poUtical movements, sometimes little embryonic movements that would burst into fuU-fledged revolution or something less violent. But there was a great deal of poUtical activity of foreign nationaUties.... We foUowed the local press.... I also used to see a lot of the statesmen and poUticians who came and find out what they thought was going on. We had aU kinds of ways of contacts with people, just to learn what they had in mind and what they were preparing.-' Back in the lands surrounding occupied Greece, SI and SO operations were designed to supplement British and Greek inteUigence while serving the particular needs of the United States, which remained largely undefined in 1943.The OSS often emphasized its apoUtical oudook, in direct contrast to that of the British, whose imperialistic agenda in the region was weU known and increasingly resented by the growing resistance movement in Greece. By the end of 1944, that resentment would grow into a fiiU-fledged confrontation. Americans observed from afar and maintained, for a Uttle longer, the cautious trust of aU poUtical parties in the country.
Before delving into this poUtical scene, it is vital to discuss the operations of the OSS in Greece and explore further the processes through which American archaeologists came to inform and articulate U.S. poUcy in the area. On the coast of Turkey, the base in Izmir directed by Caskey was only a few mUes away from the closest Greek island. It was also the most active, having handled a total of 30 missions by November 1944, when it was closed down. From Izmir and two other bases along the same coast-"Key West," which was the code name for Arslan Buru south of Kujadasi, and "Boston," north of Ali Aga-caiques (fishing boats) infiltrated occupied Greece with OSS agents, for the most part Greek personnel or Greek-Americans famiUar with the land and the language, in order to estabUsh connections in the country, especiaUy with the antartesvAio were putting up a tenacious but unequal fight against the Axis powers. Men, documents, radio equipment, gold for payments, and other suppUes to and from Greece and the Middle East passed chiefly through Izmir. Liaisons with the US. Department of State, through the embassy in Ankara and the consulate in Izmir, and with the British, Greek, Italian, and Turkish inteUigence services were aU handled by Caskey, operating undercover as a Lend-Lease officer.^' The bases in Cyprus and Alexandria, run by Oliver and Daniel, respectively, had a supporting role for the Greek SI operations en route from Egypt to Turkey.
The gathering of inteUigence was the primary goal of the base in Izmir; when refiigees or enemy deserters reached the base, OSS officers took the opportunity to interview them, adding an important body of inteUigence to the regular reports of their own agents. Dorothy Cox, who worked as a Report Officer while undercover as a civiUan relief worker for the Greek War ReUef Association in Izmir,^^ provided an interesting account of her work, as weU as the chaUenges she faced:
The refugees were questioned on military, poUtical and economic questions.... In 1941 and 1942, thousands of poor Greeks, men, women and children, fled to Asia Minor because of the difficulty in obtaining food in Greece, but by early spring of 1943, shipment of food from America had eased this situation and the majority of those coming out were men who wished to serve in the Greek armed forces, those who had been too active in the underground and were wanted by the Germans and those with poUtical ambitions. From this mixed group one got a variety of opinions which taken together gave a more or less true picture of conditions in Greece.^* Besides random groups of individuals, however, the base in Izmir had estabUshed connections with the antartes: according to Cox, "as representative of the Greek War ReUef, [they] came to [her] for supplies of clothes, food and medicine. In exchange they gave information." As for the challenges. Cox reported, we were working in a British Theater of Influence.. .. They had a definite policy with which we were in rather nebulous agreement but had no clearly defined policy of our own.... This may seem unrelated to the gathering of information, but it is not. In interviewing inteUigent men a certain give and take is necessary to inspire confidence. At no time was it possible to give any definite answer as to the opinion of the United States and what America was doing about the Atlantic Charter,^' a question which arose weekly. At aU times it was necessary to defend to some extent the rightist attitude of Great Britain as that of an aUy with whom we were cooperating. We could only say that our immediate objective was to win the war and that the United States had no desire to interfere with the internal poUtics of any nation. While making my usual excuse to one astute poUtician, saying Greek poUtics was after aU a purely Greek affair, he interrupted to say "Oh no, it is a British affair."^" Cox's description, together with the observations ofthe "astute politician" who aUuded to the century-old Anglo-Russian rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean that would culminate in the "Percentages Agreement" 27. The Greek War ReUef Association (GWRA), chaired by Archbishop of North and South America Athenagoras and Spyros P. Skouras, president of 20th Century Fox and trustee ofthe ASCSA , was formed in the United States in October 1940, w:!thin two weeks of the invasion of Greece. Its objective was to coUect fiinds with which to procure foodstuffs, medical suppUes, and clothing. The Association, as weU as the Greek Orthodox Church in the U.S., worked closely with the OSS, according to the available archival information, providing long Usts of Greeks and GreekAmericans who could be of value to the particular needs of the organization. The GWRA was also an exceUent cover for OSS agents in the field and was extensively used as such.
28. Memorandum entitled "What I did in the field," to the director ofthe OSS, January 11,1945 (NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 250, box 64, folder 4).
29. The Atlantic Charter, which was signed by Britain and the U.S. on August 14,1941, stipulated, among other things, that any territorial adjustments would be made in accord with the wishes ofthe peoples concerned and that aU peoples had the right to self-determination. See Brinkley and Facey-Crowther 1994. ' 30. NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 250, box 64, folder 4; see n. 28, above. between ChurchiU and StaUn,-*^ outUnes the internal poUtical rivalries in Greece at the time as weU as the foreign imperiaUstic trends in the region. For a better understanding ofthe poUtical and socioeconomic environment within which the OSS operated, however, it is essential to take a closer look.
POLITICAL FACTIONALISM AND REVOLT 31. The agreement, which took place at the Moscow Conference on October 9,1944, divided southeastern Europe into spheres of influence: the Soviet Union would exercise 90% influence in Romania, 80% in Bulgaria, and 80% in Hungary; Great Britain would have 90% in Greece, and Yugoslavia was equaUy divided. See Sfikas 1999 . 32. Clogg 1992 Pelt 2001. Greece had joined the family of European fascist governments already in 1936, before the Axis powers engulfed the country. General Metaxas's dictatorship, which was deeply rooted in the old schism between RepubUcans and RoyaUsts over the question of monarchy, sprang from circumstances similar to those elsewhere in Europe: the economic slump of the 1930s, the inabUity ofthe poUtical parties to reUeve the crisis, and the rise ofthe Communist party, which in the elections of 1936 held the balance of power. King George II, fearing another of the many coups that had punctuated the modern history of the country, the escalation of social unrest, the ascendance of the Communists, and probably the loss of his own position (he had, after aU, just returned from a 12-year exile), endorsed Metaxas's regime and presided over an ever-more divided country.-'T he German occupation incongruously gave rise to some new prospects for change in this scene, with the emergence of a popular movement that out of frustration with mainstream poUtics, famine, and death would create pockets of civU society away from the traditional centers of power. The Greek government, under the leadership of EmmanouU Tsouderos, together with the king and elements of the Greek armed forces, moved to Cairo, leaving the country to be ruled by a puppet government under GeneralTsolakoglou that the Germans had instaUed. WhUe the infighting for power would continue in Cairo, in occupied Greece various groups also sprang up, of which the most popular and organizationaUy stable was the National Liberation Front (EAM). Effectively led by the Communist Party (KKE), by 1943 the EAM had emerged as the most powerfiil governing body, with a central organization, a union arm, a youth movement, and a miUtary branch, the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), which would lead the resistance movement.
Rivalries among various groups would coalesce in the opposition between the EAM and the National RepubUcan Greek League (EDES). The latter was supported by factions ofthe old anti-Communist poUtical powers, on occasion coUaborated with the occupation forces, and eventuaUy played a dubious role in the fight ofthe British against ELA.S."
33. The account offered here is a broad outline of a complex history that can be studied in detaU in the numerous sources avaUable. Mazower ([1993] 2001, pp. 265-296), for example, provides an eloquent account of what he caUs the "morality of mobilization," describing the participation of the vUlagers in "people's courts," the mechanisms for pricing and distribution of food, and other reforms in which common people actively participated for the first time. Mazower also paints an intriguing picture ofthe ideological struggles within EAM and against long-estabUshed traditions, as weU as the dark and oppressive side of the movement, which prosecuted and often swiftly executed enemy coUaborators or other elusive opponents. See also Hondros 1983 and, for fiirther bibUography, Fleischer and Bowman 1981; Koulouris 2000. The British poUcy toward the resistance movement in Greece was ambivalent, ambiguous, and underhanded, to say the least. While the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) was ordered to carry out inteUigence and sabotage operations among the antartes in the mountains of Greece and to serve as the communications link between Cairo and Greek resistance organizations, a systematic effort was made to keep this coUaboration on strictly miUtary terms.^"* As the war was coming to a close and the time for political choices neared, the British openly pitted EDES against EAM, undermining the latter's authority.-'' WiUiam Donovan, the head of the OSS, in a memorandum to the jointchiefs of staff dated November 26, 1943, characterized the situation as foUows:
OriginaUy, aU gueriUa groups in Greece were set up under a joint GHQi over which the senior British liaison officer presided although his functions were, strictly speaking, only advisory. The poUtical situation has changed this and now it is the proposed policy of the British to attempt to build up the EDES group in opposition to the EAM group which is to be starved of supplies and attacked on the propaganda front.^'
As Cox had pointedly stated in her report, the U.S. had no definite poUcy for Greece, and consequently the OSS operated largely independent of any overarching governmental directive other than that of strict objectivity. Some of the most important missions in the region were designed and, upon approval from Headquarters in Washington, implemented by the Greek Desk in Cairo and the other bases abroad. Early in 1944, the acceleration of events in Greece found the OSS rather invigorated, prone to act ahead of the government it was serving and even independently of the British authorities, who were by now openly resented by the antartes. It was assessed that due to the lack of trust between the antartes and the British, the inteUigence that the OSS received through British channels was biased and inadequate. The Greek Desk, therefore, took it upon itself to go where no one had been able to go before-the Central Headquarters of EAM.
In March 1944, the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA), also caUed the "Mountain Government," in effect a third Greek government, was elected and set in motion a series of events:-'^ a mutiny of factions ofthe Greek army in Cairo, its violent suppression by the British, and ultimately the initiation of discussions between the government-ine:dle and EAM for a unity government.^^ In the midst of these events, the 34.Woodbousel948. 35. The tactic of divide et impera on which the British Empire thrived was appUed in neighboring Yugoslavia a? weU, where infighting between the resistance groups led by Tito and MihaUo-vic was greatly encouraged. The constitutional future of both countries, Yugoslavia and Greece, was at stake and in both cases British poUcy was unabashedly pro-monarchical. See Auty and Clogg 1975; Vlavianos 1989; Wheeler 1989. 36. NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 99, box 54, folder 1, "History of OSS Cairo." 37. Orchestrated by EAM, tbe "revolutionary elections" of 1944 brougbt togetber tbe revolutionaries, who advocated a complete break witb the traditional poUtical authorities, and the reformists, who maintained that some degree of coUaboration witb the government-in-exile would lead to national unity. Most importantly, however, this show of unity expressed the people's hope for a better Ufe and some form of self-determination. For an analysis of the nature of these elections and the problems surrounding them, see Mazower [1993 Mazower [ ] 2001 38. The discussions in May 1944 led to the Lebanon Agreement and tbe "Unity Government" under George Papandreou (tbe Britisb choice for the leadership), providing for 24 ministers.
Greek Desk managed to instaU three of its agents in the EAM headquarters with the general objective of "obtaining at first hand current strategic inteUigence . . . exclusively through American channels."^' The Pericles Mission, as it was known, was led by Costas Couvaras, a native Greek who had studied political science and history at CorneU University; it sought to secure an aUiance with the Central Committee ofthe EAM and, in the face of recent developments, to specialize in poUtical reporting. EAM, entirely disiUusioned with the British, and despite the avowals ofthe OSS that it "was without authority to make any poUtical commitments and that the sole modus vivendi must be a common desire to bring about the enemy's destruction," compUed with the proposition.''" It was evident that the poUtical fiiture ofthe country, once again, would not be entirely in the hands of its own people, if at aU, and EAM therefore cautiously examined the possibiUty of new alliances. British Colonel Wingate's grievance succinctly summarizes the often contentious relations between the SOE and the OSS and its so-caUed archaeological captains, a term first used to refer to the many archaeologists and classicists staffing the Greek Desk in Cairo."' The prevalent perception was that certain ofthe archaeological captains were sympathetic to EAM. On one occasion at least. Ambassador MacVeagh would caU Young to account for the misconduct in the field of OSS agents who were aUegedly supporting EAM."^ Costas Couvaras was a case in point. Couvaras spent more than five months in the mountains with the Pericles Mission, reporting extensively on EAM's activities; in his colorfiil portrayal of the antartes' endurance of hardships and struggles for social justice, he often glossed over the atrocities and cold-blooded assassinations that he -witnessed firsthand."-' The Pericles Mission pressed for the development of 12 or more large operations that would cover the whole country six of whom came from EAM. The agreement, which did not settle the issue of disarmament, would eventuaUy be breached in December of the same year.
THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL CAPTAINS AS COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS
39 and would depend on closer coUaboration between EAM and OSS, but the proposal would ultimately be rejected. In the midst of intense political activity in Cairo, the US. government hesitated to take a more direct approach, and for a little longer remained almost indifferent to the urgent caUs from the OSS field agents for direct action.'*'' Couvaras sympathized with a people that had become disillusioned with the traditional political elite and, in the middle of an atrocious occupation, had set up their own independent organizations to distribute food, and mete out justice, although they were often vindictive and excessive in their punishments. Given the likely grim political future of postwar Greece, EAM appeared to many as the most viable prospect; to others, its ascent to power was a catastrophic scenario. The modest aspirations of young people such as Pavlos, a gueriUa whose "great ambition in life [was] neither to become a policeman nor to get a comfortable government job [but to] go to America and open a restaurant," touched Couvaras the most, however, and he identified an opportunity for American policy."Î n the meantime, the antartes' leadership had a single objective in mind. In the words of Yannis Ioannides, the KKE second-in-command during the war:
There was this American agent that we had acquired over at General Headquarters.... I wanted to take fioU advantage of him. But [his superiors] were smart... what probably happened is that his superiors figured, "Look at that idiot, we sent him to sucker them and he was the one who got suckered." So it aU stopped ... but by that point in time we reaUy didn't need him as much since the end was approaching ... but those brand new weapons that they gave us were immediately sent to Athens .. . three or four separate drops... aU of it directly to Athens.''L
ÍBERATION, CIVIL STRIFE, AND AMERICAN REALPOLITIK
In February 1944, on Young's initiative, the Greek Desk had akeady drawn up what came to be known as the Young Plan, an operation that envisaged the spreading of OSS personnel aU over Greece as quickly as possible after the German evacuation.'''' It was by now clear to everyone that a period of unrest would foUow, and the Young Plan held that "in this period of uncertainties, independent, uncolored secret information regarding Greek internal and international affairs wiU provide a basis for the formulation 44 Young, as weU as anyone with a good knowledge ofthe issues in the region, anticipated that rivalries among the various poUtical parties in postwar Greece and the territorial disputes between Greeks and Albanians, as weU as Bulgarians, would lead to poUtical and social unrest, if not civU war. Already at the heart of these concerns in 1944, however, was the possibiUty that the unpopularity of British poUcy among the Greeks would result in a swing of U.S. poUcy not only toward Greece and her neighboring Balkan states, but toward the other, larger powers which have interests in those states.""Ŷ oung, along with Lieutenant Colonel JohnToulmin (a Harvard University graduate who was to become the vice president ofthe First National Bank of Boston), successor of Amoss as head ofthe OSS in Cairo, designed the operation and entered Greece on October 12,1944, the day the Germans withdrew from Athens. Young, who headed the first smaU advance team in Athens, temporarUy estabUshed a smaU office at 9 Ploutarchou Street, an address in Athens closely connected with the history ofthe ASCSA since 1929."" Soon after, the offices were moved to 1 Phidiou Street, the then vacant German Archaeological Institute building that had served during the occupation as the headquarters of the German inteUigence services. According to one of its first refxjrts, the Young team found its own intelUgence customers on their knees on its doorstep.^"
As much as a year after the Young Plan was operationaUzed, its agents found themselves without clear directives. With very little direction from Washington and on the pretext that the OSS was in Greece to dismantle operations and not to introduce new ones, the team responded to requests for information from the AUied Military Liaison (AML), UNRRA, and the U.S. Embassy in Athens. At the time, the embassy would have had access only to information provided by the Greek government, which had recently moved back from Cairo but controUed only Athens and Piraeus. The rest ofthe country was effectively in the hands of EAM, while a small part of Epirus was now controUed by EDES. By the time ofthe liberation, the OSS had 23 missions in Greece^' reporting on economic, poUtical, and miUtary conditions in the country, now not only to the OSS director via Cairo but also directly to MacVeagh, who would even recommend that the OSS be put under the control and authority ofthe embassy. ^Î n contrast to the OSS's audacity in the field, the American government's reaction was protracted and hesitant. MacVeagh succinctly summarized the situation in one of his many "Dear FrankUn" letters addressed to President Roosevelt: "ParentheticaUy, I reaUze that Yugoslavia,-and Greece to an even greater extent,-are very smaU potatoes stiU in the typical American view of foreign affairs." He emphasized, however, the importance that the region, together with the Near East, would hold for of Greek pubUc opinion toward the U.S.S.R., and possibly the increase of Russian poUtical influence in the country.
49 American poUcy, drawing attention to the weakening ofthe British empire and the need for a new kind of foreign policy:
I doubt if in any other part of the world it can appear so clearly as here,-along its principal artery,-that, miUtarily speaking, theBritish Empire is anachronistic, perfect for the eighteenth century, impossible for the twentieth.... The future maintenance of the Empire depends on how far England consents to frame her foreign poUcy in agreement with Washington, and how far we in our turn reaUze where that Empire, so important to our own security, is most immediately menaced.'M acVeagh concluded his letter with a long quotation from an OSS agent's report that acknowledged the strength ofthe movement created by EAM, the need for compromise between the traditional poUtical forces and EAM, and the failures of British poUtical maneuvering. But he would shy away from making any predictions for the immediate future, which was soon to take a gory turn.
MacVeagh largely expressed the views held by most ofthe OSS officers discussed above. Antimonarchical in principle, opposed to British colonial httgh-handed attitudes, and sympathetic to the struggles of EAM, the OSS, with its firsthand knowledge of the conditions on the ground, advocated for the development of a systematic American poUcy that would invite EAM to participate in the postwar poUtical negotiations. The OSS officers did not, however, advocate the estabUshment of a Communist regime; on the contrary, they envisioned Greece as the last stronghold against Soviet expansion in southeastern Europe.
In the Comprehensive Greek Project, designed in 1942, Young and his coUeagues had stressed the importance of operations in the country based on a nine-point argument that emphasized its strategic location for obstructing any fiiture attempts by the Axis against the Suez Canal and the oil fields of Iraq, as weU as for immediate operations against Axis-held Yugoslavia and Italy. The ninth point anticipated the postwar aUgnment of powers: "The presence of AUied forces in Southeastern Europe might serve as a check on possible Russian moves after the coUapse of Germany. A Balkan front would serve at the same time as a prop and check to Russia."" In 1942 and even untU 1947, when President Harry Truman would ask the U.S. Congress to join him in the struggle to "support free psoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,"" itwas unclear what this poUcy would consist of, but its 53. Iatrides 1980, pp. 627-628. 54 . NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 190, box 3, folder 29, "The Comprehensive Greek Project." 55. Truman's address before a joint session of Congress on March 12,1947, which became known as the Truman Doctrine, established the principles of U.S. foreign poUcy at the time, requesting $400 million in aid to Greece and Tarkey as weU as authorization to send American military and economic advisors. Truman argued that "one ofthe primary objectives ofthe foreign policy ofthe United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations wiU be able to work out a way of Ufe free from coercion. This was a fiindamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their violl, and their way of life, upon other nations." The new enemy, unspoken in his address to Congress, was none other than the U.S.S.R., and Truman would now caU for its containment by saving Greece and Turkey from perceived Russian influence. The Truman Doctrine was the first in a series of containment moves that wotUd soon take the U.S. as far afield as Korea and Vietnam. inteUectual base was slowly taking shape over these years; the archaeologists and scholars who worked for the OSS played a more or less direct role in this process.
The events that foUowed the Uberation confirmed the long-held fears, already expressed in 1942 by Young and aU the authors ofthe Comprehensive Greek Project, that poUtical factionaUsm would lead to civU war. Less than two months after the German troops' departure from Athens, and foUowing EAM's demonstration of December 3,1944, images of British troops fighting in the streets of Athens against one of the most resilient anti-Nazi movements in Europe caused rage in the House of Commons and in the British and American media. Whether the demonstration represented a takeover attempt by EAM is stiU a hody debated issue, as is the ensuing role played by the Soviet Union in the conflict." According to Biegen, the 37-day battle that foUowed between the British troops, Greek government forces, and EAM-ELAS constituted "a carefuUy laid plan for the seizure of power by the Left," into which the British "were inevitably drawn... in support ofthe government, as the legaUy constituted regime."" The British went from Uberators to instigators of a brutal civil war, further inflamed after the March 1946 elections and the September plebiscite that brought the king back. The issue that had been polarizing Greek society since the early 1920s and had for years brought negotiations between the more moderate poUtical forces to a standstiU was forced upon the Greeks by ChurchiU's myopic and nostalgic colonialist vision.'T he moral compromises that were made in the process of achieving at least a semblance of poUtical stabUity were obvious to aU American archaeologists who foUowed these events; only on a few occasions, however, were they openly criticized. In the summer of 1947, for instance, ASCSA staff members Robert L. Scranton and David M. Robinson criticized, to Uttle avail, the suppression of civU rights in Greece and the compUcity of the American Mission in the New York Times and the Baltimore Sun, 56. Answers to the first question vary, from, e.g., that of L. S. Stavrianos (1949) , who argued that there was no plot on the part of EAM, to that of WUUam H. McNeUl (1949) , U.S. miUtary attaché to Greece (1944 Greece ( -1946 , who asserted that on December 6, 1944, EAM attempted a coup d'état when it attacked the main government buildings. For a more nuanced approach, see Iatrides and Rizopoulos (2000) , who argue for a Communist coup-in-the-making that may have been either part of a larger master plan or simply an attempt to gain leverage pending fiirther negotiations. On the part that Moscow played in the conflict, scholars generaUy agree that the Soviet government, in adherence to the agreements akeady made with the British, did not encourage a Communist uprising. What has been debated, bowever.
is wbetber a Communist victory would have encouraged Soviet penetration, an argument central to Cold War poUtics in the region. The most recent, and controversial, pubUcation on the topic (Marantzidis 2010 ) emphasizes the coercive nature of the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE; the miUtary arm of EAM after 1946 that was effectively controUed by tbe KKE) and of its leadersbip, poised for power, as weU as tbe systematic assistance that the DSE received from the governments of Yugoslavia and Albania, and perbaps secretly and indirectly from tbe U.S.S.R. 57. Biegen 1948, p. 133 (ASCSA Carl W. Biegen Papers, box 25, folder 3). In 1945, wbUe he was stUl in the employ of the FNB in Washington, D.C, Biegen was invited by Harvard University Press to contribute a volume on Greece for a series focusing on tbe importance of various parts of tbe world to tbe foreign relations ofthe United States. This manuscript (Biegen 1948), which was never pubUsbed, provided an overview of Greek history and, in keeping with the project, explained Greece's geopoUtical importance to American interests. For more on Blegen's unpubUsbed book, see Lalaki 2012, esp. pp. 556-566. See also Davis, this volume, p. 19, n. 16. 58 . Roosevelt himself, howe\-er, appears to have been responsible for the King of Greece not going ahead with the plebiscite, which had already received British assent. In December 1943, whUe in Cairo, for obscure reasons be advised the king to reject the plan: Nalmpantis 2010, p. 121. respectively.^' On the other hand. Biegen condoned British.policy, or at least viewed it as inevitable, given the prospect of a Communist takeover. According to Biegen, the AUied Mission for Observing Greek Elections (AMFOGE), with British, French, and American participants, guaranteed that "it was unquestionably as fair and honest an election as could be held in a country so recently torn by civU war."'° He was equaUy encouraging about the plebiscite that recaUed the king to the throne: "The result unquestionably represented the conviction ofthe majority ofthe Greek people that at the time the only possible safeguard against Communist domination lay in raUying about the King and the monarchical form of regime."'' Alison Frantz, who had taken part in the AMFOGE in March 1946 and foUowed events closely, was less sanguine, however; on August 24,1946, she wrote to her mother, rather cynicaUy and resignedly: "The plebiscite is scheduled for a week from today. No one has any iUusions about the outcome. It wiU probably be technicaUy honest, in that the King won't get 107% of the votes as he did last time, but only the very brave repubUcans wiU dare to vote. I'm glad I wasn't involved in AMFOGE II."" FoUowing Truman's caU for economic assistance to Greece in 1947, American involvement would henceforth be systematic and decisive. While the emphasis of American poUcy toward Europe in general was on reconstruction and economic development, the problems in Greece were primarily political and miUtary.The implementation ofthe MarshaU Plan in Greece was in effect an exercise in Realpolitik meant to defend U.S. strategic interests in the area. Fearing that the expansion of Soviet infiuence in Greece would mean the faU ofthe Middle East, American advisors and administrators brought the entire Greek state apparatus under their direct control, openly manipulated the Greek government, gave almost absolute control to the military, which they separated from civil political authority, and tolerated mass executions and the open persecution of the Left by a regime that, in the American media, was often compared with that ofthe Nazis."
ARCHAEOLOGISTS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: TREASON OR RESPONSIBILITY?
On December 20,1919, under the heading "Scientists as Spies," The Nation published a letter by Franz Boas, the father of academic anthropology in America. In it. Boas charged that four American anthropologists had abused their professional research positions by conducting espionage in Central America during the First World War. He strongly condemned their actions, stating that they had "prostituted science by using it as a. 59.1 thank NataUa VogeikoffBrogan for bringing Scranton's letter to the New York Times ("Greek Situation Appraised: Cessation of Suppression Held First Step in Solving Nation's Problems, " July 15,1947, p. 22) to my attention. The Baltimore Sun article ("Dr. Robinson Finds Greece Graft Ridden," November 3,1947, p. 26 ) is mentioned in a letter from Louis E. Lord (chairman of the Managing Committee, 1939 -1950 cover for their activities as spies." According to Boas, other professionals such as soldiers, diplomats, politicians, and businessmen "may be excused if they set patriotic devotion above common everyday decency and perform services as spies. They merely accept the code of moraUty to which modern society StiU conforms. Not so the scientist. The very essence of his Ufe is the service of truth."" Boas's scathing critique reproduces many of the normative definitions of scientists' and inteUectuals' obUgations and moral codes. JuUen Benda, possibly the founding theorist of the sociology of inteUectuals, defined them as "aU those whose activity is not in the pursuit of practical aims, aU those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical speculation," and he maintained that their duty was "to set up a corporation whose sole cult is that of justice and of truth."*^ According to Edward Said, marginaUty and exile provide the conditions for the emergence of the true inteUectual.'^ Furthermore, due to their devotion to ideas not always in harmony with society's more pragmatic concerns, inteUectuals can often find themselves alienated.'Ŝ ince modernity seems to have replaced faith with reason and reUgion with science, inteUectuals and scientists have come to embody what our modern societies hold sacred: objective knowledge independent of personal interests and subject only to observation, experiments, and the laws of nature. Archaeology as a discipUne has gone to great lengths to estabUsh itself as a science, and the ASCSA's archaeologists have every reason to take pride in their adherence to rigorous methodology, attention to minute detail, and use of modern technologies in their research endeavors. The definitions of Boas, Benda, and even Said reflect precisely this ideal type of knowledge to which inteUectual Ufe aspires.
Yet the story discussed here and, indeed, world history suggest otherwise.'^ Said's pubUc inteUectual Ufe is, after aU, a testament to the fact that marginaUty does not necessarily indicate an apoUtical inteUectual Ufe. Scholars, inteUectuals, and scientists are more directly engaged with the pubUc sphere than has often been acknowledged. As critics of orthodoxy and dogma (a common connotation of the term "inteUectual"),'' as counselors and advisors to governments, experts are an integral part of pubUc and poUtical Ufe. Practical reaUties require that our societies and, stUl more, democracies depend on experts and expert knowledge.'" The history of modernity and of the state itself is coterminous with the history of the rise of the inteUectual,'' and, as Zygmunt Bauman fiirthermore asserts, "there is a constitutive affinity between the poUtical rulers and the cultural leaders... the relation is, rather, of a Haßliebe type. Suspicion and dissent constantly alternate with a powerfiil attraction-nay, fascination-with the power of the state."'^ The extensive literature on nationaUsm, state formation, and state projects such as colonization and empire building points to the importance of inteUectualism and scholarly production for establishing and maintaining rule.'T he coUaboration between the OSS and Biegen, Young, and most of the archaeologists associated with the ASCSA and Greece at that time indicates not a merely lukewarm relationship with the American government, but a conscious political engagement and commitment to the liberal American ideals of democracy, popular sovereignty, and self-determination. Yet their commitment, as often happens, did not extend to direct, overt criticism oftheir government when it became clear that the road to democracy was taking a few very undemocratic detours. At that point, their national aUegiance and ideological choices proved stronger than their inteUectual and professional commitment to truth and impartiality. They identified the role that the U.S. was caUed upon to play within the new emerging world system and they saw the strategic importance of Greece in America's impending rivalry with the Soviet Union; many of them acknowledged the need for political change, to which a compromise between EAM and the traditional political eUte could lead. Cautious about their own professional futures, as weU as that of the institution they represented, however, they refrained from any pubUc expression of their discontent and quietly transferred responsibiUty to the public-poUcy experts.
But how can we account for these events in the inteUectual history of the ASCSA without reaching the impasse that dichotomies such as "treason" versus "responsibility" can generate? The argument developed by Yannis HamUakis with regard to the broader role of archaeologists in the field of cultural production and their respective responsibiUties as inteUectuals is situated precisely at the center of this dichotomy. He argues that along with the realization that the archaeological record preserves only fragmented material traces ofthe past that are produced as a "record" or "evidence" comes a certain inteUectual responsibiUty to chaUenge the regimes ofthe "production of truths" and to interrogate the links of knowledge with power.'^"' I suggest that we can further qualify this argument, which assumes a complete break between political and inteUectual authority, by directing our attention to the various ways that knowledge is employed and the different publics that it often addresses. Michael Burawoy, for instance, distinguishes among four types of sociological knowledge that can, by analogy, be discerned in the field of archaeology as weU; he discusses and differentiates among policy, public, professional, and critical knowledge, aU four forms being interdependent, albeit antagonistic at times.^' Policy sociology, he argues, responds to specific requests and goals set by a cUent, providing answers and solutions to any given set of problems. Public sociology, on the other hand aspires to generate dialogue between sociology and a pubUc. Not unlike policy sociology, it is practiced outside the strict academic boundaries ofthe discipline in the pubUc sphere-in the media, for instance. Unlike poUcy sociology, however, which is often practiced in very private spheres bounded by expertise, knowledge, and authority, pubUc sociology invites the community-the public-into a dialectic relationship. Neither policy nor public is possible, however, without professional sociology, which "supplies true and tested methods, accumulated bodies 73. Foucault 1980; Anderson 1983; Herzfeld 1986; Chartier 1991; Giesen 1993; Stoler 1995; Steinmetz 1999; Boyer and Lomnitz 2005; Frankel 2006 . 74. Hamilakis 1999 . 75. Burawoy 2005 76. Burawoy 2005 , p. 267. 77. Bourdieu 1996 . 78. Shanks and TUley 1987 of knowledge, orienting questions, and conceptual frameworks."^* Professional sociology consists of multiple intersecting research programs, fields, and subfields; it is institutionaUy bounded; and, to borrow from Bourdieu's theory of fields," it constitutes its own structured social space: it has, among other things, its own rules, schemes of domination, and legitimate opinions. Lastly, critical sociology, the conscience of professional sociology, in the same way that public sociolog}' is the conscience of poUcy sociology, is meant to examine the foundations of professional sociology, and stands for reflexivity within the discipline's professional circles. Burawoy's categorical distinctions point to the differentiated uses of sociological knowledge, further suggesting that each aspect of the discipline has its own sets of truths to which it adheres, draws legitimization from different sources, has its own accountability, and, last, has its own pathologies. Most importantly, Burawoy makes a distinction between sociology and its internal divisions and the sociologists, who at any time may occupy multiple locations and cut across the various divisions ofthe discipline.
Archaeologists, too, may find themselves in different trajectories in their field-occupying academic positions, for instance, working from within the estabUshed norms and theoretical frameworks of their profession, while advising the state on issues of cultural heritage management and development, thereby applying their professional expertise to issues of pubUc poUcy and administration. The development of archaeological parks and museums, the promotion of ctiltural and archaeological tourism, and the institution of cross-national research and educational programs-to mention only a few examples-are based on the close coUaboration of what we can caU "professional" and "poUcy" archaeology. The pubUc is, most often inadvertently, invited into the discussion, since questions of culture often touch upon daily concerns and issues related to urban development and economic considerations, as weU as questions of power, authority, and identity. The removal in the 1930s of over 500 private residences that stood on top ofthe ancient Agora of Athens to make way for the excavation of the site, or the development in the 1990s of the archaeological site and museum at Vergina, a project closely entangled with national and identity poUtics in Macedonia, exempUfy the pubUc character of archaeology and the pressures that this aspect ofthe field can place on professional archaeology. Like any field dedicated to the production and promotion of knowledge, archaeology has a strong ethical, political, and cultural dimension that places it in direct dialogue with society and the public.
In the 1980s Michael Shanks and Christopher TiUey argued persuasively that the field of archaeology was in a state of deep crisis,^^ which to a great extent reflected the reluctance of the discipline to consider the lessons learned from a series of critiques coming from the directions of critical theory, feminist studies, hermeneutics, and poststructuraUsm. In brief, archaeology, holding firm to its commitment to construct a disinterested and objective understanding ofthe past, feU out of tune with its social reaUty. Lacking a more reflexive and critical standpoint, archaeology and its practitioners were faiUng to address two vital questions: "archaeology for whom?" and "archaeology for what?"
The ASCSA, from within the boundaries of scholarship and professionaUsm, has carefuUy refrained from public discussions that pertain to the products of its work, while also cautioning its members against any i.-ivolvement in activities that may have poUtical consequences.^' Moreover, i-: has engaged only hesitantly with critical archaeology and the discussions that take place among critical inteUectuals who may transcend discipUnary boundaries. A discussion ofthe ASCSA's partnership with the OSS may seem an embarrassment in the history of an institution that has so carefiiUy Grafted its nonpoUtical image. Archaeologists, along with anthropologists and scholars generaUy, however, have always shaped policy, and not merely the development of cultural poUcy. Again today, in the face ofthe obstacles presented by Afghanistan and Iraq, the AUied forces together with the U.S. Department of Defense are caUing for greater cultural insight. Scholars have certainly been invited to participate in the discussion; it is clear that many have already responded to the caU and that others wiU foUow.*°T he OSS story offers an opportunity to discuss an event in the history cf the ASCSA that is neither exceptional nor unique. It may appear sinister, hut only if it remains concealed from the public sphere and unexamined by the archaeologists themselves, who ought to engage in reflexivity not merely as practitioners within their field but also as social, poUtical, and cultural agents. The coUaboration between the OSS and the academic community was mandated by historical'circumstances and hardly constitutes "treason" vis-à-vis the archaeologists' inteUectual and professional cbUgations. I maintain, however, that our scholarly practices have a strong social dimension, that our cultural and research institutions are accountable not only to peer review but also to the publics that they serve, direcdy or indirectly. Dialogue among the various divisions of archaeological labor can only lead to greater democratization of knowledge.
COMING HOME TO ROOST PoUtical and inteUectual activities occupy different spheres, and, as Edv/^ard ShUs has pointed out, they cannot be practiced simultaneously over extended periods of time.^'TraditionaUy, scholars are more committed to tiieir discipUnary traditions and obUgations than to their political or other civil responsibiUties. Most ofthe archaeologists affUiated with the ASCSA returned to work as soon as the occupation was over, whUe the fight between tiie EAM and the government was stiU raging in Athens. The city, and to an even greater extent the rest of Greece, would be a dangerous place f^Dr travel and research for some time to come, but new opportunities for institutional advancement soon became very clear. The postwar American intervention in Greece created a favorable poUtical and economic environment for the work of institutions such as the ASCSA. Many of its members, such as Biegen, Frantz, and Caskey, were also advantageously positioned as weU-connected and experienced pubUc servants by the end of the war. Biegen would serve as cultural attaché ofthe U.S. Embassy in Athens for a year; in 1946 he would be succeeded by Frantz, who served until 1949. While in these positions, using networks of pubUc officials and individuals with great financial resources who were for various reasons drawn into the Greek postwar situation, they would work hard to advance the interests ofthe ASCSA.
The inteUectual and cultural capital ofthe ASCSA, which since 1931 has been excavating in the Athenian Agora, the civic center of ancient Athens, presents infinite opportunities to celebrate the victories of democracy. From this angle. Biegen energeticaUy lobbied for the inclusion of a museum for the ancient Agora in a MarshaU Plan project for the reconstruction and rehabiUtation of Greek museums in the interest of advancing tourism and economic development.^-^ Frantz was instrumental in the estabUshment of the Fulbright Foundation in Greece, a program through which for years the ASCSA would draw a disproportionate share of the applicant pool, fiirther soUdifying the institution's position as the sole point of entry for American archaeologists, historians, and classicists in Greece.^-' The first decade of the postwar American presence in Greece was one of the most productive for the ASCSA. Under Caskey's directorship (1949 Caskey's directorship ( -1959 , the School would complete one of its most ambitious and symboUcaUy burdened projects, clearly proclaiming the American commitment to Uberty and democracy: the reconstruction ofthe Stoa of Attalos as the museum ofthe ancient Agora.^"The museum, an undertaking that the School had been planning and negotiating with the Greek archaeological authorities for years before the war, would evolve into an over $3 million enterprise that tied into the broader discussions of the time about Greece's fiiture. The promotion of cultural heritage raised great hopes for the growth of tourism and economic development and, in consequence, poUtical stabiUty and democratization.
If the archaeologists' coUaboration -with the OSS seems Uke a tale of strange bedfeUows, an improbable relationsbip forged in the extremities ofthe war, closer examination ofthe ASCSA's postwar work may fijrther iUuminate the reciprocity of the relationship between administrative and scholarly preoccupations. If "the arts of domination and administration require attention to rhetoric, ideological invention, and communication across different stations as weU as rational calculation," as Dominic Boyer and Claudio Lomnitz propose, scholarly and inteUectual activities are enabled by the poUtical and economic networks in which they are embedded.^^ Ultimately, by recognizing the agency of American archaeologists in state projects such as the one undertaken by the OSS, and by bringing them out of their dimly Ut offices and silent Ubraries into the public light, we of necessity redefine and reixnagine their role in relation to the societies and the pubUcs that they serve.
